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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
In 1980 Pacific Employers Insurance Company 
(―PEIC‖) purchased a certificate of reinsurance (the 
―Certificate‖) from Constitution Reinsurance Corporation 
(―Constitution‖), the predecessor of Global Reinsurance 
Corporation of America (―Global‖).  In this case, one 
sentence from that Certificate stands in the spotlight.  That 
sentence reads, ―As a condition precedent, the Company [i.e., 
PEIC] shall promptly provide the Reinsurer [i.e., 
Constitution, now Global] with a definitive statement of loss 
on any claim or occurrence reported to the Company and 
brought under this Certificate which involves a death, serious 
injury or lawsuit.‖ 
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When we read this sentence in the context of the entire 
Certificate, we agree with the District Court that it is fairly 
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation.  PEIC must 
provide Global with a definitive statement of loss (―DSOL‖) 
on a subset of claims or occurrences, specifically those that 
involve a death, serious injury or lawsuit.  When must PEIC 
do this?  We believe it is promptly after someone reports such 
a claim or occurrence to it, not promptly after it demands 
indemnity from Global.  If PEIC dawdles, the consequences 
can be severe.  PEIC‘s compliance with this provision is a 
condition precedent to Global‘s duty to reinsure — that is, its 
duty to make indemnity payments relating to the underlying 
claim or occurrence — and not merely its duty to make such 
payments promptly. 
Parting ways with the District Court, we hold that this 
provision is enforceable as written.  Our choice-of-law 
analysis points to New York, not Pennsylvania, law.  Under 
New York law, when a reinsurance contract expressly 
requires a reinsured to provide its reinsurer with prompt 
notice of a claim or occurrence as a condition precedent to 
coverage and the reinsured fails to do so, that failure excuses 
the reinsurer from its duty to perform, regardless whether the 
reinsurer suffered prejudice as a result of the late notice.  For 
these reasons, and because no genuine issue of material fact 
remains, we reverse the District Court‘s Final Order and 
Judgment and remand with instructions that it enter a 







I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
A.  Reinsurance Basics 
A brief reinsurance primer is in order.
1
  Put 
colloquially, reinsurance is insurance for insurance 
companies.  A reinsurer agrees to indemnify a reinsured for 
certain payments the latter makes under one or more of its 
issued policies.  In return, the reinsurer receives a share of the 
underlying premiums.  Ceding a portion of an insured risk 
prevents a single catastrophic loss from hurling the reinsured 
into insolvency.  It also allows the reinsured to invest more 
capital or to insure more risks. 
The reinsured may be either a primary or an excess 
insurer.  Both cover policy holders directly, but excess 
coverage kicks in only after an insured‘s primary coverage is 
exhausted.  In contrast, reinsurers do not cover policy holders 
directly.
2
  Instead, they issue ―certificates‖ of reinsurance to 
their reinsureds. 
                                              
1
 For a more comprehensive introduction to reinsurance, see 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 609 F.3d 143 
(3d Cir. 2010); British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Safety Nat’l 
Cas., 335 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2003); N. River Ins. Co. v. 
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 
571 (N.Y. 1992). 
 
2
 A reinsurance certificate may contain a so-called ―cut 
through‖ provision that grants insureds a direct right of action 
against the reinsurer.  See Jurupa Valley Spectrum, LLC v. 
Nat’l Indem. Co., 555 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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There are two basic types of reinsurance:  treaty and 
facultative.   
Under a reinsurance treaty, 
the reinsurer agrees to accept an 
entire block of business from the 
reinsured. Once a treaty is written, 
a reinsurer is bound to accept all 
of the policies under the block of 
business, including those as yet 
unwritten. Because a treaty 
reinsurer accepts an entire block 
of business, it does not assess the 
individual risks being reinsured; 
rather, it evaluates the overall risk 
pool.  
Facultative reinsurance 
entails the ceding of a particular 
risk or policy. Unlike a treaty 
reinsurer who must accept all 
covered business, the facultative 
reinsurer assesses the unique 
characteristics of each policy to 
determine whether to reinsure the 
risk, and at what price. Thus, a 
facultative reinsurer retains the 
faculty, or option, to accept or 
reject any risk. 
N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 





B.  Buffalo Forge Purchases Insurance; PEIC 
Purchases Reinsurance 
Our story begins when the Buffalo Forge Company 
(―Buffalo Forge‖), a manufacturing company located 
principally in Buffalo, New York, purchased insurance for 
itself and its affiliates.  First, it bought a ―comprehensive 
general liability insurance policy‖ (the ―Primary Policy‖) 
from Utica Mutual Insurance Company.  That policy had a $1 
million limit.  It also purchased an ―excess blanket 
catastrophe liability policy‖ (the ―Excess Policy‖), with the 
same policy period, from PEIC, then a California stock 
insurance company located in Los Angeles.  The Excess 
Policy provided $9 million of coverage in excess of the 
Primary Policy‘s $1 million. 
Meanwhile, to spread some of the risk of the Excess 
Policy, PEIC purchased the Certificate (a facultative 
reinsurance contract) from Constitution, a New York 
corporation located in New York.  Under the Certificate, 
PEIC retained the first $1 million of the Excess Policy and 
Constitution agreed to reinsure 25% of the next $4 million, 
with a $1 million limit. 
It does not appear that there was any direct 
―negotiation‖ over the Certificate‘s terms and conditions.  
While preparing to issue the Excess Policy, PEIC — through 
its Buffalo underwriting office — asked a broker in 
Minnesota to make inquiries about reinsurance coverage.  The 
broker then communicated with several reinsurers, including 
Constitution.  It sent a telex, dated May 30, 1980, to 
Constitution in New York to confirm that it was seeking 
binding reinsurance effective June 1, 1980, with PEIC 
retaining the first $1 million and Constitution reinsuring a 
25% share of the next $4 million, in exchange for a $15,000 
gross premium.  Constitution replied by telex on June 5, 
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1980, confirming its acceptance of PEIC‘s terms.  The broker 
and Constitution had further exchanges in September 1980 
about the payment of premiums and the issuance of the 
Certificate.  Eventually Constitution caused the Certificate, 
according to its signature line, ―to be signed by its President 
and Secretary at New York, New York,‖ and sent it to PEIC‘s 
broker in Minnesota.  In return, PEIC sent Constitution‘s 
share of the premiums from Buffalo Forge to PEIC‘s 
Minnesota broker, who forwarded it to Constitution in New 
York. 
To offset further the risk of the Excess Policy, three 
other reinsurers also participated in Constitution‘s reinsured 
layer.  Of the four, two were New York companies, one an 
Illinois company, and one a Massachusetts company. 
Eighteen and nineteen years after the issuance of the 
Certificate, respectively, PEIC and Constitution underwent 
corporate reorganization.  In 1998, Gerling Global 
Reinsurance Corporation acquired Constitution and merged it 
into a newly formed corporation that is now Global 
Reinsurance Corportion of America, the appellant here.  Like 
its predecessor, Global is a New York corporation with its 
principal place of business in New York.  PEIC underwent a 
more significant change in 1999.  Previously a California 
company located in Los Angeles, that year PEIC became a 
Pennsylvania corporation with its primary place of business 
in Philadelphia. 
C.  The Terms and Conditions of the Certificate 
The Certificate is four pages long and does not contain 
an express choice-of-law provision.  On the first page, Items 
3 and 4 set out the amount of risk retained by PEIC (referred 
to as the Company) and the amount of reinsurance accepted 
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by Constitution (referred to as the Reinsurer).  Specifically, 
they state: 
ITEM 3 - COMPANY 
RETENTION 
THE FIRST $1,000,000 
SUBJECT TO FACULTATIVE 
REINSURANCE. 
ITEM 4 - REINSURANCE 
ACCEPTED  
$1,000,000 ANY ONE 
OCCURRENCE AND IN THE 
AGGREGATE WHERE 
APPLICABLE PART OF 
$4,000,000 WHICH IS EXCESS 
OF $1,000,000 WHICH IN 
TURN IS EXCESS OF 
UNDERLYING INSURANCE. 
Item 5 indicates that Constitution‘s ―Basis of Acceptance‖ is 
―Excess of Loss,‖ which is later defined to mean that ―[t]he 
limit(s) of liability of the Reinsurer, as stated in Item 4 of the 
Declarations (Reinsurance Accepted) applies(y) only to that 
portion of loss settlement(s) in excess of the applicable 
retention of the Company as stated in Item 3 of the 
Declarations.‖ 
 The second page is titled ―Reinsuring Agreements and 
Conditions.‖  Significantly, the preamble on this page states 
the fundamental nature of the agreement: 
In consideration of the payment of 
the premium, and subject to the 
terms, conditions and limits of 
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liability set forth herein and in the 
Declarations made a part thereof, 
the Reinsurer does hereby 
reinsure the ceding company 
named in the Declarations (herein 
called the Company) in respect of 
the Company‘s policy(ies) as 
follows:[.] 
Following this first sentence, the second page outlines certain 
terms and conditions.   
Paragraph A contains a ―follow-the-fortunes‖ clause, 
linking PEIC‘s liability under the Excess Policy to 
Constitution‘s liability under the Certificate, and a ―follow 
form‖ clause, importing into the Certificate the terms and 
conditions of the Excess Policy ―except when otherwise 
specifically provided.‖  It reads in relevant part: 
A. . . . The liability of the 
Reinsurer, as specified in Item 4 
of the Declarations, shall follow 
that of the Company and shall be 
subject in all respects to all the 
terms and conditions of the 
Company‘s policy except when 
otherwise specifically provided 
herein or designated as 
nonconcurrent reinsurance in the 
Declarations . . . . 
 Paragraph D describes circumstances in which PEIC 
must provide Constitution with certain information about 
claims or occurrences reported to it under the Excess Policy.  




D. As a condition precedent, the 
Company shall promptly provide 
the Reinsurer with a definitive 
statement of loss on any claim or 
occurrence reported to the 
Company and brought under this 
Certificate which involves a 
death, serious injury or lawsuit. 
The Company shall also notify the 
Reinsurer promptly of any claim 
or occurrence where the Company 
has created a loss reserve equal to 
(50) percent of the Company‘s 
retention. While the Reinsurer 
does not undertake to investigate 
or defend claims or suits, it shall 
nevertheless have the right and 
shall be given the opportunity, 
with the full cooperation of the 
Company, to associate counsel at 
its own expense and to join the 
Company and its representatives 
in the defense and control of any 
claim, suit or proceeding 
involving this Certificate of 
Reinsurance. 
Paragraph E explains how a loss settlement affects 
Constitution, how PEIC presents reinsurance bills, and how 
Constitution pays them.  It provides: 
E. All loss settlements made by 
the Company, provided they are 
within the terms and conditions of 
this Certificate of Reinsurance, 
shall be binding on the Reinsurer. 
12 
 
Upon receipt of a definitive 
statement of loss, the Reinsurer 
shall promptly pay its proportion 
of such loss as set forth in the 
Declarations. In addition thereto, 
the Reinsurer shall pay its 
proportion of expenses (other than 
office expenses and payments to 
any salaried employee) incurred 
by the Company in the 
investigation and its proportion of 
court costs and interest on any 
judgment or award, in the ratio 
that the Reinsurer‘s loss payment 
bears to the Company‘s gross loss 
payment . . . . 
The Certificate goes on to define the components of a 
DSOL, referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph D and the 
second of Paragraph E, as ―those parts or portions of the 
Company‘s investigative claim file which in the judgment of 
the Reinsurer are wholly sufficient for the Reinsurer to 
establish adequate loss reserves and determine the 
propensities of any loss reported hereunder.‖  Id. 
D.  Buffalo Forge Gives Notice to PEIC; PEIC 
Gives Notice to Global  
In the early 1990s, claimants across the country began 
inundating Buffalo Forge with asbestos-related lawsuits.  It 
first notified PEIC, its excess carrier, of these claims and suits 
in April 2001.  By 2004, Buffalo Forge‘s Primary Policy was 
exhausted.  Beginning in October 2005, PEIC instructed its 
broker to keep its reinsurers informed about developments in 
the Buffalo Forge matter.  PEIC asked its broker to forward 
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billings, notices, and updates to its reinsurers in 2006, 2007, 
and 2008, but apparently the broker failed to do so. 
Instead, PEIC first told Global, having succeeded 
Constitution, about the Buffalo Forge matter in April 2008 
when it sent a one-page claim report to Global‘s New York 
office.  The report did not demand any payment from Global.  
It was not until more than a year later, in September 2009, 
that PEIC‘s payments under the Excess Policy exceeded its 
$1 million retention.  Around that time, PEIC sent its first 
bill, dated September 2, 2009, for $559,071.67 to Global‘s 
New York office through PEIC‘s Minnesota broker.  PEIC 
also emailed a copy directly to Global.  Along with the 
billing, PEIC submitted supporting information and portions 
of its investigative claim file.  On October 6, 2009, Global 
responded with a reservation-of-rights letter to PEIC‘s 
Philadelphia office that, among other things, requested 
additional information and disputed some areas of coverage.  
On November 2 and 4, 2009, Global audited PEIC‘s files at 
PEIC‘s offices in Philadelphia.  During the audit, Global 
apparently discovered that PEIC first received notice of the 
Buffalo Forge matter in April 2001, yet PEIC did not notify 
Global of the Buffalo Forge situation until April 2008.  In a 
November 11, 2009 letter, Global asserted a late-notice 
defense. 
E.  The District Court Proceedings 
 In December 2009, PEIC sued Global for breach of 
contract, seeking $559,072 and a declaration of its rights.  
Global answered, denied liability, and asserted a counterclaim 
for its own declaratory relief.  Specifically, it sought a 
declaration that it had no liability under the Certificate 
because PEIC failed to satisfy Paragraph D‘s DSOL 
requirement.  In the alternative, it sought a declaration that 
the Certificate capped its maximum liability at $1 million, 
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inclusive of expenses.  Global moved for a judgment on the 
pleadings on this issue, and the District Court agreed that the 
Certificate‘s $1 million limit is unambiguously inclusive of 
expenses. 
In May 2011, the District Court denied Global‘s 
motion for summary judgment on the Certificate liability 
issue.  See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Global Reinsurance Corp. 
of Am., No. 09-6055, 2011 WL 2003359 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 
2011).  The Court found that Paragraph D‘s DSOL provision 
unambiguously requires PEIC to provide Global with a 
DSOL promptly after Buffalo Forge reports a claim or 
occurrence involving a death, serious injury, or lawsuit to 
PEIC under the Excess Policy, not promptly after Buffalo 
Forge reports such a claim to PEIC and PEIC submits a claim 
for payment to Global under the Certificate.  Further, the 
Court found that PEIC‘s compliance with Paragraph D‘s 
DSOL provision is unambiguously a condition precedent to 
Global‘s obligation to provide reinsurance coverage 
altogether, rather than simply a condition precedent to 
Global‘s obligation to remit payment promptly. 
The Court also addressed whether Paragraph D‘s 
DSOL provision is enforceable as written.  Global claimed 
that New York law applied while PEIC insisted that 
Pennsylvania law did.  The Court acknowledged, as the 
parties agreed, that under New York law when a reinsurance 
contract expressly sets prompt notice as a condition precedent 
to coverage, a court will enforce the condition as written and 
not require the reinsurer to prove prejudice in the event of late 
notice.  As there was no holding from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania directly on point, the District Court ―predict[ed] 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold [contrary to 
New York law] that a reinsurer must prove prejudice to avoid 
coverage even where the cedant breached a notice condition 
that is a condition precedent.‖  Confronted with a true 
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conflict, the Court conducted a choice-of-law analysis and 
concluded that Pennsylvania‘s predicted must-show-prejudice 
rule applied.  Because Global failed to allege facts to support 
a finding of prejudice, the Court ruled that Global could not 
succeed under Pennsylvania law. 
After the denial of Global‘s motion for summary 
judgment, the parties agreed that there were no issues left for 
trial and stipulated to entry of a final judgment that embodied 
the Court‘s rulings.  The Final Order and Judgment decrees 
that PEIC shall recover from Global $507,926 plus interest 
and that Global must pay all future billings under the 
Certificate up to $1 million, inclusive of expenses. 
PEIC appeals the District Court‘s interpretation of 
Paragraph D‘s DSOL provision and Global challenges the 
District Court‘s prediction of Pennsylvania law and its 




II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review the District Court‘s denial of summary judgment 
embedded in its stipulated Final Order and Judgment de novo 
and apply the same standard the District Court applied.  See 
Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We will reverse if ―there is no genuine dispute as to 
                                              
3
 Because Global is entitled to a judgment of non-liability as a 
result of our holding, PEIC‘s limit-of-liability appeal is moot.  
Thus we have no occasion to consider the Second Circuit‘s 
decision in Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), which PEIC asserts is much 
maligned in the reinsurance industry.  
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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III.  Interpreting Paragraph D’s DSOL Provision 
A.  Rules of Interpretation 
The division of labor between court and fact-finder 
when interpreting a contract, and the basic rules of 
interpretation, are well established and do not differ between 
New York and Pennsylvania.  First, we must determine (as a 
matter of law) whether contractual language is ambiguous.  
See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); 
Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 
1986).  If we determine that the language is unambiguous, we 
follow its plain meaning.  If, however, we conclude that the 
language is ambiguous, we leave it to a fact-finder to decide 
its meaning.  See Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins., 
Inc., 905 A.2d 462, 469 (Pa. 2006); Amusement Bus. 
Underwriters v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 489 N.E.2d 729, 732 
(N.Y. 1985). 
 A contract is ambiguous only if it is ―written so 
imperfectly that it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.‖  Brad H. v. City of New York, 951 N.E.2d 
743, 746 (N.Y. 2011); see also Ins. Adjustment Bureau, 905 
A.2d at 468-69.  The mere fact that the parties do not agree on 
the proper construction does not make a contract ambiguous.  
See Metzger v. Clifford Realty Corp., 476 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984). 
Because ―the law does not assume that the language of 
the contract was chosen carelessly,‖ that language is of 
paramount importance.  Meeting House Kane, Ltd. v. Melso, 
628 A.2d 854, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  ―The parties have a 
right to make their own contract, and it is not the function of 
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the court to rewrite it or give it a construction in conflict with 
the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.‖  
Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007).  This is not to say that we can be overly myopic.  
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, we must 
―examine the entire contract‖ and ―[p]articular words should 
be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but [rather,] 
in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of 
the parties as manifested thereby.‖  Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180-
81 (quoting Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 
418, 418 (N.Y. 1927)).  In this regard, ―all provisions in the 
agreement will be construed together and each will be given 
effect‖ because a court ―will not interpret one provision . . . in 
a manner which results in another portion being annulled.‖  
Lesko v. Frankford Hosp. Bucks-County, 15 A.3d 337, 342 
(Pa. 2011). 
B.  PEIC’s Duty to Provide a DSOL Promptly 
We begin our merits analysis with some common 
ground.  Recall that Paragraph D‘s first sentence provides:  
―As a condition precedent, [PEIC] shall promptly provide 
[Global] with a definitive statement of loss on any claim or 
occurrence reported to [PEIC] and brought under this 
Certificate which involves a death, serious injury or lawsuit.‖  
Whatever PEIC‘s obligation might be, it clearly only applies 
to (1) a ―claim or occurrence,‖ (2) that is ―reported to 
[PEIC],‖ and (3) that ―involves a death, serious injury or 
lawsuit.‖   
Although the Certificate does not define ―claim‖ or 
―occurrence,‖ the parties appear to agree on their meaning.  A 
―claim,‖ at least as relevant here, is generally a demand for 
payment or relief made against the persons or entities covered 
by the Excess Policy or a similar demand made against PEIC.  
An ―occurrence‖ is defined under the Excess Policy as ―an 
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accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, which results in personal injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured.‖  J.A. 122.  The Certificate does not specify who 
must ―report[] to‖ PEIC the referenced claims or occurrences.  
But surely the phrase ―claim or occurrence reported to 
[PEIC]‖ refers to a claim or occurrence that PEIC‘s insureds 
or their representatives report to it under the Excess Policy. 
Disagreement begins when we consider when PEIC 
must remit a DSOL under Paragraph D.  Global says it is 
promptly after an insured reports a claim or occurrence 
involving a death, serious injury, or lawsuit to PEIC under the 
Excess Policy.  PEIC says it is promptly after it demands 
payment from Global under the Certificate. 
The dispute turns, in large part, on the words ―and 
brought under this Certificate.‖  According to Global, a claim 
or occurrence is ―brought under this Certificate‖ if it is swept 
within the general scope of the Certificate‘s reinsurance 
coverage, or, put differently, if it is among the types of claims 
or occurrences that the Certificate generally covers.  The 
District Court agreed.  See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 2011 WL 
2003359 at *5 (finding that the phrase ―claim or occurrence . . 
. brought under this Certificate‖ means ―that which its plain 
meaning confers upon it, merely those types of claims which 
fall under Global‘s reinsurance coverage‖).  As such, 
Paragraph D does not require PEIC to provide a DSOL for 
any claim or occurrence of a type that the Certificate does not 
cover.  For example, two pages of the Certificate are devoted 
to excluding from reinsurance coverage certain losses and 
liabilities relating to ―nuclear energy risks.‖  See J.A. 77.2-.3 
(clause titled ―NUCLEAR INCIDENT EXCLUSION 
CLAUSE - LIABILITY – REINSURANCE‖).  If a claim or 
occurrence were reported to PEIC under the Excess Policy 
that is excluded from the Certificate by the nuclear incident 
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clause, then Paragraph D would not require PEIC to provide 
Global with a DSOL on that claim or occurrence because it is 
not ―brought under this Certificate.‖  Importantly, as Global 
sees it, whether a claim or occurrence is ―brought under this 
Certificate‖ can and must be determined at the time it is 
reported to PEIC. 
PEIC disagrees, and argues that a ―claim or 
occurrence‖ is ―brought under this Certificate‖ only when it 
seeks an indemnity payment from Global related to the claim 
or occurrence.  Here, PEIC did not seek payment from Global 
until September 2009.
4
  Thus, no claim or occurrence was 
―brought under this Certificate‖ before then and PEIC had no 
duty to provide Global a DSOL.  
In a brief, unsigned ―summary order,‖ the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit — examining provisions 
identical to the first sentence of Paragraph D — held that the 
―terms of the reinsurance certificates create ambiguity as to 
what event triggers the duty to promptly provide a DSOL.‖  
Folksamerica Reinsurance Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., No. 04-
2716-CV, 182 Fed. Appx. 63, 64 (2d Cir. May 26, 2006).  If 
we were to isolate Paragraph D‘s first sentence and consider 
nothing else, we might agree.  But when we read that 
sentence in the context of the Certificate as a whole, 
examining its structure and other provisions, we are 
convinced that Global‘s reading is the correct one.  
But even before we turn to the Certificate‘s other 
provisions, we see that PEIC‘s reading creates problems 
within Paragraph D‘s first sentence.  As noted, that sentence 
is not limited to ―claim[s]‖ reported under the Excess Policy, 
                                              
4
 Global neither concedes nor contests that the materials PEIC 
sent in September 2009 were sufficient to meet the 
Certificate‘s definition of a DSOL.   
20 
 
but rather expressly applies to ―claim[s] or occurrence[s].‖  
This confirms that the obligation it imposes comes into play 
before PEIC demands payment under the Certificate.  
Occurrences (accidents) exist apart from claims (demands for 
relief).  While some occurrences may ripen into one or more 
claims, others may not.  If (as PEIC suggests) Paragraph D‘s 
DSOL provision applies only after PEIC demands payment 
from Global, such a reading becomes nonsensical as applied 
to occurrences because it would require a DSOL for an 
occurrence only after it became a claim.  In other words, if we 
accept PEIC‘s reading, the words ―or occurrences‖ in the 
Certificate would be superfluous.  See Capek v. Devito, 767 
A.2d 1047, 1050 (Pa. 2001) (―[A]n interpretation will not be 
given to one part of the contract that will annul another part 
of it.‖) (quotation marks omitted); Northville Indus. Corp. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 679 N.E.2d 
1044, 1047-48 (N.Y. 1997) (―[C]ourts, in interpreting 
policies, should strive to give meaning to every sentence, 
clause, and word of a contract of insurance.‖) (quotation 
marks and alterations omitted). 
Moving to the second sentence of Paragraph D, we 
find a second notice obligation that further illuminates the 
purpose served by the Paragraph‘s first notice obligation, the 
DSOL provision.  This sentence moves beyond the subset of 
claims or occurrences — those ―involving a death, serious 
injury or lawsuit‖ — covered in the first sentence, and instead 
reaches ―any‖ claim or occurrence.  It provides that PEIC 
―shall also notify [Global] promptly of any claim or 
occurrence where [PEIC] has created a loss reserve of fifty 
(50) percent of [PEIC‘s] retention specified in Item 3 of the 
Declarations.‖ Id. (emphases added).  Unlike the first 
sentence of Paragraph D, the second sentence does not 
require PEIC to report a subset of claims or occurrences 
immediately after Buffalo Forge reports them under the 
Excess Policy.  Instead, PEIC must report all claims or 
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occurrences when it creates a loss reserve of 50% ($500,000) 
of its $1 million retention.  Furthermore, when it notifies 
Global that it has reserved beyond the $500,000 trigger point, 
PEIC does not have to provide a DSOL. 
A logical insurance purpose surfaces for the disparate 
treatment of those claims or occurrences that involve ―a 
death, serious injury or lawsuit‖ and those that do not.  As 
noted, under the Certificate PEIC retained the first $1 million 
of exposure on its Excess Policy.  Thus, some claims or 
occurrences reported to PEIC under that policy may be of no 
concern to Global because they may not reach into Global‘s 
reinsured layer.  If a reinsurer had to determine for itself 
whether any particular underlying claim or occurrence could 
potentially affect it, the system of reinsurance would not work 
efficiently.  See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. 
Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993) (―Reinsurance works 
only if the sums of reinsurance premiums are less than the 
original insurance premium. . . .  For the reinsurance 
premiums to be less, reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but 
necessary efforts of the primary insurer in evaluating risks 
and handling claims.  Reinsurers may thus not have actuarial 
expertise, or actively participate in defending ordinary 
claims.‖) (citation omitted).   
Paragraph D deals with the disparate treatment issue 
by setting up for Global the right to divide the labor between 
it and PEIC.  When a claim or occurrence carries certain 
indicia of potential seriousness — namely, the involvement of 
―a death, serious injury or lawsuit‖ — Global contracted for 
the right to assess for itself whether the matter might develop 
into something so significant that it could activate its 
reinsured layer.  In the absence of such potentially serious 
claims or occurrences, Global chose to rely on PEIC‘s 
judgment, but with the agreement that after PEIC concludes 
that Global‘s layer is in danger of being breached — by 
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setting reserves for itself of 50% of its retention — it must 
notify Global of any claim or occurrence reported regardless 
whether it involves a death, serious injury or lawsuit.   
Why would a reinsurer want to receive a DSOL on a 
potentially serious claim or occurrence when it is first 
reported to its reinsured rather than when its reinsured 
demands indemnity?  We discern two reasons.  First, as its 
definition makes clear, a DSOL allows a reinsurer to 
―establish adequate loss reserves and determine the 
propensities of any loss reported‖ under the Certificate.  
Allowing PEIC to wait until it actually demands payment 
under the Certificate undermines this fundamental purpose.  
―[E]stablish[ing] adequate loss reserves and determin[ing] the 
propensities of any loss reported‖ are anticipatory measures 
that allow a reinsurer to forecast and prepare for future losses 
and to allocate funds for possible payment.  Taking these 
steps after PEIC demands payment under the Certificate 
would make little sense.
5
  Second, Global may wish to 
                                              
5
 PEIC raises a side issue about the definition of a DSOL.  It 
argues that the DSOL requirement is an ―illusory‖ promise.  
To be sure, the information required in a DSOL includes a 
discretionary element — the information PEIC submits must 
be ―in the judgment of [Global] . . . wholly sufficient‖ for 
Global to set reserves.  But the inclusion of a discretionary 
element in a standard of performance does not render the 
standard meaningless or unenforceable:  PEIC and Global 
must exercise their judgment reasonably and in good faith, 
and their determinations are subject to review in any 
subsequent litigation.  See Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 
N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995) (―Where the contract 
contemplates the exercise of discretion, this pledge includes a 
promise not to act arbitrarily or irrationally in exercising that 
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exercise its ―right to associate,‖ as guaranteed by the third 
sentence of Paragraph D.  Permitting PEIC to submit a DSOL 
only after it actually demands payment under the Certificate 
could wipe out Global‘s contractual right to associate in the 
defense and control of claims as they develop.  In that case, 
Global may not receive notice of a claim until PEIC has 
already handled it, depending on whether PEIC created a 
50%-of-retention reserve and notified Global accordingly.   
Paragraph E imposes another DSOL obligation that, 
contrary to PEIC‘s suggestion, fails to undermine Global‘s 
interpretation.  That Paragraph provides that 
[a]ll loss settlements made by 
[PEIC], provided they are within 
the terms and conditions of the 
original policy(ies) and within the 
terms and conditions of this 
Certificate of Reinsurance, shall 
be binding on [Global].  Upon 
receipt of a definitive statement of 
loss, [Global] shall promptly pay 
its proportion of such loss as set 
forth in the Declarations.   
As PEIC acknowledges, under this provision it must remit a 
DSOL when it demands that Global pay the latter‘s 
proportion of losses under the Certificate, regardless whether 
the underlying claim involved a death, serious injury, or 
lawsuit.  But this begs the question:  If Paragraph E requires 
PEIC to send Global a DSOL when PEIC demands any 
indemnity for loss payments under the Certificate, then why 
does Paragraph D also require a DSOL for a subset of 
                                                                                                     
discretion.‖); Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 
138, 148 (Pa. Super. 1985). 
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particularly serious underlying claims?  The only reasonable 
interpretation is that the paragraphs impose two different 
obligations that arise at different times.  Thus, under 
Paragraph D, PEIC must first promptly provide Global with a 
DSOL on a subset of claims or occurrences — those 
involving ―a death, serious injury or lawsuit‖ — promptly 
after they are reported.  Then, under Paragraph E, PEIC must 
later submit a DSOL when it demands any payment from 
Global under the Certificate.  If, at that time, PEIC is 
demanding payment related to an underlying claim that 
involves a death, serious injury, or lawsuit, then it should be 
submitting a DSOL for the second time.  If the Certificate 
only required PEIC to submit a DSOL when it seeks payment 
under the Certificate, the first sentence of Paragraph D would 
simply be surplusage.  To interpret the contract that way 
would violate a cardinal rule of contractual interpretation that 
counsels against rendering words or provisions meaningless.  
See Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 865 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (N.Y. 
2007); Morris v. Am. Liab. & Sur. Co., 185 A. 201, 202 (Pa. 
1936). 
After a close examination of the Certificate‘s other 
provisions, a big-picture look at the Paragraph D DSOL 
provision‘s place in the Certificate‘s overall structure 
confirms our interpretation.  The Certificate‘s terms and 
conditions move sequentially through the life of the 
reinsurance relationship.  First, Paragraphs A, B, and C 
establish the reinsurance relationship itself.  Next, Paragraph 
D describes PEIC‘s duties and obligations from the moment it 
receives notice of a claim or occurrence under the Excess 
Policy through the investigation of such a claim and the 
defense of any lawsuit.  Then, Paragraph E details how, if an 
underlying claim is resolved by PEIC, it presents reinsurance 
bills to Global and how Global pays them.  This structure 
suggests that the first sentence of Paragraph D — because it 
appears in Paragraph D (which addresses the notice and 
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development of claims) and not Paragraph E (which 
addresses the presentation and payment of reinsurance bills) 
— must create an obligation that is triggered at the time PEIC 
receives notice of an underlying claim or occurrence.   
After considering every provision of the Certificate 
and how they fit together, we conclude that Paragraph D 
unambiguously requires PEIC to provide Global with a 
DSOL on any claim or occurrence that involves a death, 
serious injury or lawsuit promptly after such a claim or 
occurrence is reported to it under the Excess Policy. 
C.  The Consequences for Breach 
Having decided what event triggers PEIC‘s obligation 
to provide a DSOL under Paragraph D, we turn to what 
consequences the Certificate provides for a failure to comply 
with that obligation.  The District Court found that ―the only 
reasonable interpretation‖ of ―[a]s a condition precedent‖ in 
the first sentence of Paragraph D is that it creates a 
prerequisite to Global‘s duty to provide reinsurance coverage.  
Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 2011 WL 2003359 at *4.6  Therefore, if 
PEIC does not comply with the DSOL provision, then (under 
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 By way of background, a condition precedent — often 
referred to simply as a condition — is generally ―an event, 
not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-
occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract 
becomes due.‖  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224; see 
also Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control 
Bd., 739 A.2d 133, 139 (Pa. 1999) (―Where a condition has 
not been fulfilled, the duty to perform the contract lays 
dormant and no damages are due for non-performance.‖) 




the terms of the Certificate) Global is not only excused from 
its obligation to remit payment promptly, but it is excused 
from its obligation to remit payment at all.   
 Admittedly, the condition precedent phrase could have 
been drafted more clearly.  It might have provided, for 
example, that ―As a condition precedent to any liability on the 
part of Global under this Certificate, . . . .‖  But a contract 
does not have to be perfect to be unambiguous.  Global‘s 
interpretation is, we believe (as did the District court), the 
only reasonable one. 
To begin, the preamble makes reinsurance coverage, 
not just Global‘s duty to remit payment promptly, subject to 
the Certificate‘s conditions.  Specifically, it provides that 
Global ―does hereby reinsure‖ PEIC ―subject to the terms, 
conditions, and limits of liability set forth herein.‖  Paragraph 
D‘s ―condition precedent‖ — PEIC‘s obligation to remit a 
DSOL — is undeniably a ―condition[] set forth‖ in the 
Certificate.  Thus, PEIC‘s failure to comply with that 
condition excuses Global from its promise to ―hereby 
reinsure‖ it under the Certificate. 
When reading the first sentence of Paragraph D in 
context, it becomes even clearer that the consequences for 
failing to comply with it must be different in kind than the 
consequences for failing to comply with other provisions in 
the Certificate.  No other provision in the Certificate uses 
―condition precedent‖ language.  For example, Paragraph D‘s 
second provision makes no mention of a ―condition 
precedent,‖ and simply provides that ―[PEIC] shall also notify 
[Global] promptly of any claim or occurrence where [PEIC] 
has created a loss reserve equal to (50) percent of [PEIC‘s] 
retention.‖  Thus, while Paragraph D‘s first sentence creates a 
condition precedent to coverage, the second (like all other 
27 
 
provisions in the Certificate) is an ordinary contractual 
covenant the breach of which may entitle Global to damages 
but does not automatically forfeit coverage. 
Finally, if the ―as a condition precedent‖ language did 
anything other than create a condition precedent to coverage, 
PEIC could simply wait until presenting a bill for payment 
under the Certificate before submitting its first DSOL without 
repercussion, and thereby eviscerate Global‘s other 
contractual rights.  In that case, Global would lose its ―right to 
associate‖ and its right to forecast adequate loss reserves and 
determine the propensity of losses when serious claims or 
occurrences are reported. 
IV.  Conflicts Analysis 
We consider next whether the applicable state law 
would either (1) enforce the express condition precedent as 
written or (2) require Global to prove that it suffered 
prejudice from any late DSOL remittance.  Global argues that 
New York law applies, and that it would enforce the 
Certificate as written without requiring proof of prejudice.  
PEIC counters that Pennsylvania law applies, and that it 
would require Global to prove prejudice.  We agree with 
Global.
7
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 As a preliminary matter, PEIC insists that Global has 
waived its argument that New York law applies.  We 
disagree.  The most cursory of glances at the District Court‘s 
opinion reveals that this is not so.  The Court mentioned that 
―Global argues that New York law should apply, which does 
not require a reinsurer to demonstrate prejudice resulting 
from late notice but that, in any event, Pennsylvania and New 
York law do not conflict on this point.‖  2011 WL 2003359 at 
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A.  The Applicable Choice-of-Law Rules 
As a federal court sitting in diversity, we apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the forum state, which is Pennsylvania 
in this case.  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fogel, 656 F.3d 
167, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2011).  ―Pennsylvania applies the . . . 
flexible, ‗interests/contacts‘ methodology to contract choice-
of-law questions.‖  Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 
220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007).   
When a contract like the Certificate does not contain 
an express choice-of-law provision (or indicate that the 
parties implicitly agreed to be bound by a particular state‘s 
law), the first step in the analysis is to identify the 
jurisdictions whose laws might apply.  Id. at 230.  As 
candidates, the parties offer New York and Pennsylvania.  
Next, we must determine the substance of these states‘ laws, 
and look for actual, relevant differences between them.  Id.  
―If [the] two jurisdictions‘ laws are the same, then there is no 
conflict at all, and a choice of law analysis is unnecessary.‖ 
                                                                                                     
*6.  The Court goes on to devote half of its opinion to the 
choice-of-law issue.  Id. at *5-*10.  Although we disagree 
with the Court‘s analysis, we cannot pretend that it does not 
exist.  Furthermore, it is an open question whether choice-of-
law issues are waiveable in this Circuit.  See Huber v. Taylor, 
469 F.3d 67, 75 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that we ―have not 
adopted a consistent rule regarding whether choice of law 
issues are waiveable,‖ and discussing cases in which we ―held 
that choice of law questions cannot be waived‖ and another in 
which ―we considered the choice of law question waived‖).  
As we did in Huber, we decline to resolve this tension 
because Global did not waive its argument, even assuming 
that it is waiveable. 
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Id. (emphasis in original).  If there are actual, relevant 
differences between the laws, then we ―examine the 
governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the 
conflict as a ‗true,‘ ‗false,‘ or an ‗unprovided-for‘ situation.‖  
Id.  ―A deeper choice of law analysis is necessary only if both 
jurisdictions‘ interests would be impaired by the application 
of the other‘s laws (i.e., there is a true conflict).‖  Id. 
(quotation marks and alteration omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
B.  New York Law 
The law of New York is not in dispute.  When a 
reinsurance contract expressly requires a reinsured to provide 
its reinsurer with prompt notice of a claim or occurrence as a 
condition precedent to coverage and the reinsured fails to do 
so, that failure excuses the reinsurer from its duty to perform, 
even if it did not suffer prejudice as a result of the late notice.  
To understand New York‘s interests in having this rule apply 
here, a brief account of the rule‘s development is necessary. 
In Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. North River 
Insurance, 594 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1992), the Court of Appeals 
of New York addressed how courts should interpret a prompt 
notice provision that is not explicitly a condition precedent to 
coverage.  At that time, New York courts had long applied a 
―settled‖ rule of construction to primary insurance contracts:  
the notice provision ―operates as a condition precedent and . . 
. the insurer need not show prejudice to rely on the defense of 
late notice.‖  Id. at 573.  They recognized this as a ―limited 
exception to two established rules of contract law:  (1) . . . 
ordinarily one seeking to escape the obligation to perform 
under a contract must demonstrate a material breach or 
prejudice; and (2) . . . a contractual duty ordinarily will not be 
construed as a condition precedent absent clear language 
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showing that the parties intended to make it a condition.‖  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Before considering whether this no-prejudice-required 
exception should apply in the reinsurance context, the 
Unigard Court made clear that it was addressing the issue in 
the context of the contract before it.  Id. at 574.  The contract 
in that case required the reinsured to provide ―prompt notice . 
. . of any occurrence or accident which appear[ed] likely to 
involve th[e] reinsurance,‖ but it did not use the words 
―condition precedent‖ or any other words indicating an intent 
to create a condition precedent.  Id. at 572.  The Court noted 
that ―[t]here is nothing in [the notice provision or elsewhere 
in the contract] indicating that the parties intended that the 
giving of notice should operate as a condition precedent.  If 
ordinary rules of contract were applied, the prompt notice 
provision in the . . . certificate would not be construed as a 
condition precedent.‖  Id. at 573-74 (citation omitted). 
With this caveat in mind, the Court pointed to 
differences between primary insurance and reinsurance, and 
held that a reinsurer must demonstrate how any late notice 
caused it prejudice before coverage could be excused.  Id. at 
575.  It considered prompt notice to be ―of substantially less 
significance for a reinsurer than for a primary insurer‖ 
because ―[a] reinsurer is not responsible for providing a 
defense, for investigating the claim or for attempting to get 
control of the claim in order to effect an early settlement.‖  Id. 
at 574.  And although late notice may impair a reinsurer‘s 
―right to associate,‖ the Court found that such a risk was not 
―sufficiently grave to warrant applying a presumption of 
prejudice.‖  Id. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
confirmed that Unigard‘s must-show-prejudice rule is a 
default rule of contract construction that parties may contract 
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around with an express condition precedent.  See Christiana 
Gen. Ins. Corp. of N.Y. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 
274 (2d Cir. 1992).  Citing Unigard, the Second Circuit noted 
that ―[f]or a reinsurer to be relieved from its indemnification 
obligations because of the reinsured‘s failure to provide 
timely notice, absent an express provision in the contract 
making prompt notice a condition precedent, it must show 
prejudice resulted from the delay.‖  Id. at 274 (emphasis 
added); see also Constitution Reinsurance Corp. v. Stonewall 
Ins. Co.,980 F.Supp. 124, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d 
mem. on opinion below, 192 F.3d 899 (Table) (2d Cir. 1999). 
New York‘s rule is rooted in freedom of contract.  ―An 
express contract for indemnity,‖ like the Certificate, ―remains 
a contract[;]  [h]ence, the parties are free, within limits of 
public policy, to agree upon conditions precedent to suit.‖  
Constitution Reinsurance Corp., 980 F.Supp. at 131 (quoting 
Continental Cas. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 19 (2d 
Cir. 1996)). 
 C.  Predicting Pennsylvania Law 
The parties do not agree on the law of Pennsylvania.  
This is hardly surprising because the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has not addressed (1) how a court should 
interpret a prompt notice provision in a reinsurance contract 
that is not an express condition precedent to coverage or (2) 
whether parties may contract around a default must-show-
prejudice rule with an express condition precedent. 
In the absence of a controlling opinion from a state‘s 
highest court on an issue of state law, we typically predict 
how that court would decide the issue.  See Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000).  When 
predicting state law, we ―can . . . give due regard, but not 
conclusive effect, to the decisional law of lower state courts.‖  
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Id.  But ―[t]he opinions of intermediate appellate state courts 
are ‗not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is 
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of 
the state would decide otherwise.‘‖ Id. (quoting West v. 
AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). 
The District Court began with the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania‘s decision in Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 
371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977).  That case addressed late notice in 
the primary insurance context, but — unlike Unigard — it did 
not announce a default rule of construction; it went further.  
Brakeman held that, under a liability insurance policy, late 
notice will not relieve an insurer of its coverage obligations 
unless it proves that breach of the notice provision caused it 
prejudice.  Id. at 198.  The Court made no exception for 
policies that make prompt notice an express condition 
precedent to coverage.  In fact, the policy at issue provided 
that ―[n]o action shall lie against [the insurer] unless, as a 
condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully 
complied with all the terms of th[e] policy.‖  Id. at 195.  Thus, 
under Brakeman public policy trumps notice provisions that 
are express conditions precedent to coverage. 
The Brakeman Court jettisoned its insistence on ―the 
freedom of private contracts‖ in this context for two reasons.  
Id. at 196.  First, ―an insurance contract is not a negotiated 
agreement; rather its conditions are by and large dictated by 
the insurance company to the insured.‖  Id.  Specifically, ―an 
insured is not able to choose among a variety of insurance 
policies materially different with respect to notice 
requirements, and a proper analysis requires this reality to be 
taken into account.‖  Id.  Second, it would be ―unfair to 
insureds,‖ and ―unduly severe and inequitable,‖ to allow an 
insurance company to accept the insured‘s premiums and then 
seek to deny coverage ―unless a sound reason exists for doing 
so.‖  Id. at 196-98.  A notice provision is not meant ―to 
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provide a technical escape-hatch by which to deny coverage.‖  
Id. at 197 (quotation marks omitted).   
Only one Pennsylvania case, Ario v. Underwiting 
Members of Lloyd’s of London Syndicates, 996 A.2d 588, 598 
(Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2010), even mentions the prejudice issue in 
the reinsurance context.  There, the Commonwealth Court 
devoted only two sentences to the law on point: 
[T]he ―notice-prejudice‖ rule 
applies in both Pennsylvania and 
New York. See Brakeman v. 
Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193 
(1977); see also Unigard Sec. Ins. 
Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 594 
N.E.2d 571 (1992). Under this 
rule, unless the insurer establishes 
prejudice resulting from the 
insured‘s failure to give notice as 
required under the policy, the 
insurer cannot avoid its 
contractual obligation. Brakeman, 
371 A.2d at 198. Unigard, 594 
N.E.2d at 573.   
Id.
8
  The Court could not decide whether the reinsurer was 
prejudiced on the record before it; thus, it denied summary 
judgment.  Id.   Further diluting any guidance the case offers, 
the reinsurance agreement at issue did not contain an express 
condition precedent.  In fact, it did not contain any notice 
requirement at all; the reinsurer argued that the ―follow form‖ 
provision incorporated the notice requirements from the 
underlying direct policy.  Id. at 591, 598.  
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 As our discussion above demonstrates, Ario‘s account of 
New York law is incomplete.   
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Global correctly points out that, under Pennsylvania 
law, the invalidation of contract provisions on public policy 
grounds is a rare and significant exercise of judicial power.   
In the absence of a plain 
indication [that a contract 
provision is contrary to public 
policy] through long 
governmental practice or statutory 
enactments, or of violations of 
obvious ethical or moral 
standards, the Court should not 
assume to declare contracts 
contrary to public policy.  The 
courts must be content to await 
legislative action.   
Heller v. Pa. League of Cities & Municipalities, 32 A.3d 
1213, 1220-21 (Pa. 2011) (quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).   
It is only when a given policy is 
so obviously for or against the 
public health, safety, morals or 
welfare that there is a virtual 
unanimity of opinion in regard to 
it, that a court may constitute 
itself the voice of the community 
in so declaring [that the contract 
provision is against public 
policy]. 
Id. at 1221 (quotation marks omitted).  
Still, we suspect that Pennsylvania‘s interest in 
preventing technical forfeitures of coverage drops a heavy 
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counterweight.  In the primary insurance context, we have 
recognized that ―the Brakeman rule applies even to policies 
between sophisticated parties.‖ Trustees of the Univ. of Pa. v. 
Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890, 897 (3d Cir. 1987).  In 
Trustees, we discerned that ―although a sophisticated 
consumer has greater power and experience with which to 
negotiate individual terms of an insurance policy, . . . 
Brakeman rested above all on the court‘s unwillingness to 
permit a forfeiture of insurance protection ‗unless a sound 
reason exists for doing so.‘‖ Id.  Trustees, however, did not 
involve a notice requirement expressed as a condition 
precedent.  In fact, we made clear that we were not deciding 
―whether Pennsylvania courts would enforce an explicit 
waiver of Brakeman’s protection by a sophisticated insured.‖ 
Id. at 897 n.2. 
Our suspicion about Pennsylvania law is further 
enhanced by our prediction that ―under New Jersey law . . . a 
reinsurer must show prejudice in order to prevail on a late 
notice defense asserted against its reinsured.‖  British Ins. Co. 
of Cayman v. Safety Nat’l Cas., 335 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 
2003) (emphasis added).
9
  In that case, we acknowledged that 
the contract-of-adhesion rationale for a must-show-prejudice 
rule does not apply as strongly in the reinsurance context, but 
concluded that the fairness rationale does, and ultimately this 
carries the day.  Admittedly, reinsurance contracts ―do not 
bear all the indicia of adhesion endemic in contracts for 
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 The notice provision at issue in British Insurance, however, 
did not include condition-precedent language.  Id. at 207.  As 
a result, we had no occasion to consider whether parties could 
overcome the must-show-prejudice rule with an express 
condition precedent to coverage.  Still, the decision provides 
some insight as to how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
might decide the issue before us. 
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primary coverage;‖ and they are ―clearly more in the nature 
of indemnity agreements between two sophisticated insurance 
companies.‖  Id. at 213.  Nonetheless ―[t]he New Jersey 
Supreme Court clearly frowns upon literal interpretation of 
notice provisions in situations where it results in the insured 
forfeiting coverage it has already paid for absent some 
countervailing consideration (such as prejudice) on the part of 
the insurer that has accepted premiums in return for offering 
coverage.‖  Id. at 213.  For that reason, we predicted New 
Jersey law would still require a showing of prejudice in 
reinsurance cases.   
British Insurance is consistent with ―the differences in 
the contractual undertakings of primary insurers and 
reinsurers because notice provisions are significantly less 
important to the reinsurer than a primary insurer.‖  Id.  Notice 
of claims and occurrences in the primary insurance context 
―afford[s] the insurer an opportunity to form an intelligent 
estimate of its liabilities, to afford it an opportunity to 
investigate the claim while witnesses and facts are available 
and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it.‖  Id. at 213 
(quotation marks omitted).  In the reinsurance context, it is 
the sole obligation of the ceding insurer to investigate, 
litigate, settle, or defend claims and, while the reinsurer may 
have a ―right to associate,‖ we considered that right 
(especially since it is rarely exercised) insufficient to 
outweigh New Jersey‘s policy against forfeiture.  Id. at 214. 
Predicting the substance of state law in the absence of 
a controlling opinion from that state‘s highest court is an 
uncomfortable consequence of our diversity jurisdiction.  
Such speculation intrudes ―on the lawmaking function of that 
state court,‖ and creates a ―fundamental incompatibility . . . 
with the most basic principles of federalism‖ because ―judges 
who are not selected under the state‘s system and who are not 
answerable to its constituency are undertaking an inherent 
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state court function.‖  Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge 
Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 
78 Va. L. Rev. 1671, 1682, 1687 (1992).  Our discomfort is 
compounded here because the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has ―affirmed [its] reticence to throw aside clear 
contractual language based on the often formless face of 
public policy.‖  Heller, 32 A.3d at 1220 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
Global suggests that we can minimize the strains on 
federalism that an ―Erie guess‖10 would cause by simply 
inverting the usual order of the choice-of-law analysis in 
those cases where the guesses themselves are ultimately 
unnecessary because the analysis calls for the application of 
another state‘s well-settled law.  We cannot, however, 
conduct a proper choice-of-law analysis without forming 
some prediction of a candidate state‘s law and its interest in 
having that law apply.  Given our review of Pennsylvania law 
and our precedent, we assume without deciding, solely for the 
sake of our choice-of-law analysis, that Pennsylvania would 
apply a must-show-prejudice rule to reinsurance contracts, 
even when the contract makes the notice provision an express 
condition precedent to coverage. 
D.  Which State’s Law Applies? 
Given our assumption about Pennsylvania law, we are 
confronted with a true conflict.  Applying a must-show-
prejudice rule would promote Pennsylvania‘s assumed 
interest in protecting its reinsureds from losing coverage that 
they have already paid for in the absence of a sound reason 
for doing so.  In contrast, applying New York law here would 
promote its interest in protecting sophisticated business 
                                              
10
 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding 
that substantive state law applies in diversity cases). 
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parties‘ freedom to enter into contracts without having their 
terms disregarded or rewritten by courts.  In this context, 
applying one state‘s law would impair the interests of the 
other, and there is a true conflict. 
Because we assume a true conflict exists, we 
―determine which state has the greater interest in the 
application of its law.‖  Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 231 
(quotation marks omitted).  To do so, we use a methodology 
that combines the approaches of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts of Law and governmental interest analysis.  Id.  We 
begin ―the analysis by assessing each state‘s contacts under 
the Second Restatement,‖ and ―turn to § 188(2) (the general 
provision governing contracts), which directs us to take the 
following contacts into account: (1) the place of contracting; 
(2) the place of negotiation of the contract; (3) the place of 
performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the 
contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties.‖  Id. at 
232-33.
11
  This requires ―more than a mere counting of 
contacts.‖  Id. at 231 (quotation marks omitted).  Instead, ―we 
must weigh the contacts on a qualitative scale according to 
the policies and interests underlying the particular issue.‖  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the precise place of contracting is somewhat 
unclear, but New York certainly had a more significant 
relationship to the Certificate‘s formation than Pennsylvania 
did, given that Pennsylvania had no relationship whatsoever 
in 1980.  ―[T]he place of contracting is the place where . . .  
the last act necessary, under the forum‘s rules of offer and 
acceptance, [occurred] to give the contract binding 
effect . . . .‖ Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 188 
                                              
11
 PEIC concedes that § 188 is the proper section of the 
Restatement to consider.  See PEIC Br. 30. 
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cmt. e.  Insurance contracts often designate that place as the 
place of delivery   Crawford v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of 
N.Y., 221 A.2d 877,880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).  Here, 
Constitution delivered the Certificate to PEIC‘s broker in 
Minnesota, but the parties do not address whether delivery 
was in fact the last act necessary.
12
  The District Court found 
that offer and acceptance became complete in New York 
when Constitution confirmed by cable dated June 5, 1980, its 
agreement to participate for 25% of the $4 million excess 
layer.  Thus, ―the place of contract formation was New 
York,‖ which ―PEIC concedes . . . is arguably the case.‖  
2011 WL 2003359, at *9. 
There were no meaningful negotiations concerning the 
Certificate.  PEIC‘s Minnesota broker exchanged telexes with 
Constitution in New York, but the terms and conditions were 
never in dispute.  Thus, it is difficult to speak at all of a 
―place of negotiation.‖  
Both possible places of performance that we discussed 
in Hammersmith — ―where the premiums are received‖ and 
―the state in which notice should have been provided‖ — 
point to New York.  480 F.3d at 234, 234 n.13.  In this case, 
Buffalo Forge sent its premiums under the Excess Policy to 
                                              
12
 For example, the Court of Appeals of New York has 
explained that in ―the London market — the Mecca of the 
reinsurance world,‖ an exchange of telexes constitutes a 
binding agreement, and ―[d]elivery of the original insurance 
policy to the reinsurer and issuance by the latter of a formal 
certificate of reinsurance may not occur until much later, and 
indeed are technically unnecessary for a binding agreement.‖  
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd.-U.S. Branch v. 




PEIC‘s broker in Minnesota, which then sent Constitution in 
New York its share under the Certificate.  As for ―the state in 
which notice should have been provided,‖ notice is due where 
the entity to be notified is located, which in this case is, and 
has always been, New York.  Id. at 234.  For our purposes, it 
is the place of performance. 
The subject matter of the Certificate, a contract of 
indemnity, is PEIC‘s liability to Buffalo Forge.  It is difficult 
to pinpoint an actual "location" for such an abstract subject 
matter.  To the extent it is located anywhere, an insurer's 
liability on a policy simply shares a location with the insurer 
itself.  In that context, the location of the subject matter of the 
Certificate is the same as the location of PEIC.  
 Turning to the location of the parties, we reiterate that 
while PEIC is now a Pennsylvania corporation domiciled in 
Pennsylvania, it was a California stock insurance company 
located in Los Angeles when the Certificate was issued in 
1980.  PEIC only became a Pennsylvania insurance company 
in 1999.  In contrast, Constitution was (and Global is) a New 
York corporation domiciled in New York. 
Having identified the contacts that § 188 deems 
important, we calibrate our qualitative scale to ensure that we 
weigh the contacts according to the policies and interests 
underlying the particular issue before us.  Id. at 231.  
According to PEIC, ―the issue at hand is the nature of the 
obligations imposed by the contract rather than the validity of 
the contract.‖  PEIC Br. 34 (quotations and alterations 
omitted).  The opposite is in fact true.  We have already 
decided much of the nature of the relevant obligation 
imposed, namely Paragraph D‘s DSOL provision.  We have 
decided when that obligation arises and whether it qualifies as 
a condition precedent to coverage or as something else, and 
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we have done so without first conducting a choice-of-law 
analysis because the basic rules of interpretation do not differ 
between New York and Pennsylvania.  What is before us is 
whether a prompt notice provision that is expressly stated as a 
condition precedent to coverage is valid and enforceable as 
written. 
 With this mind, we acknowledge that the Restatement 
(Second) instructs courts to consider various fundamental 
principles when conducting a choice-of-law analysis.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6(2).  When 
determining which state has the most significant relationship 
to a contract and the issue concerns the validity of a 
contractual provision, the protection of the parties‘ justified 
expectations is ―of considerable importance.‖  Id. at § 188 
cmt. b.  This comes as no surprise because ―[p]rotection of 
the justified expectations of the parties is the basic policy 
underlying the field of contracts.‖  Id. at § 188 cmt. b.  When 
the validity of a contractual provision is at stake, the parties‘ 
expectations should be measured from their vantage point at 
the time of contracting, because ―[p]arties entering a contract 
will expect at the very least, subject perhaps to rare 
exceptions, that the provisions of the contract will be binding 
upon them.‖  Id.  ―Their expectations should not be 
disappointed by application of the local law rule of a state 
which would strike down the contract or a provision thereof 
unless the value of protecting the expectations of the parties is 
substantially outweighed in the particular case by the interest 
of the state with the invalidating rule in having this rule 
applied.‖  Id.  
When we use the protection of justified expectations to 
adjust the weight of the contacts discussed above, we are 
convinced that New York has the most significant 
relationship to the Certificate.  A New York reinsurer 
accepted, in New York, the terms and conditions proposed by 
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a Minnesota broker, acting on behalf of the New York 
underwriting office of a California company located in Los 
Angeles.  At the time, there would have been simply no 
reason for the parties to expect that Pennsylvania law would 
govern whether particular provisions of the contract they 
were entering into were valid as written.  Pennsylvania 
entered the picture, as a matter of pure happenstance, 19 years 
later when PEIC relocated to Pennsylvania.  PEIC has not 
pointed us to any authority that would justify allowing this 
unilateral decision to blur our focus on the facts and the 




 Finally, we must consider the ―interests and policies 
that may be validly asserted by each jurisdiction.‖ 
Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 235 (quotation marks omitted).  
New York has an interest in protecting the rights of 
sophisticated parties, particularly New York reinsurers and 
insurers who operate out of New York offices, to enter into 
contracts and to have their terms enforced predictably, with 
administrative ease, and without second guesses from the 
courts after costly litigation.  Our comments in Hammersmith 
about New York‘s interest in the primary insurance context in 
                                              
13
 Citing our decision in Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fogel, 656 
F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2011), PEIC claims that we should assess 
the parties‘ justified expectations about the validity of 
Paragraph D‘s DSOL provision at the time when it moved to 
Pennsylvania.  Amica holds that when a district court 
transfers an action sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the 
transferor forum‘s choice-of-law rules travel with the action 
to the transferee forum.  Id. at 169-70.  It neither says nor 
implies anything about one party‘s post-contract move to 
another jurisdiction changing the parties‘ justified 
expectations about the validity of their contract provisions. 
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having a need-not-show-prejudice rule are also relevant here:  
―New York has decided that requiring strict compliance with 
notice provisions is the most effective means of protecting 
certain interests of insurance carriers.  We will not substitute 
our judgment for that of the New York courts by concluding 
that a prejudice rule would just as effectively serve these 
interests.‖  Id. at 232 n.12. 
 Pennsylvania has an interest in ensuring that its 
cedants receive coverage that they have paid for and that 
reinsurers avoid ―technical escape-hatches‖ to coverage in the 
absence of prejudice.  The District Court also found that 
―Pennsylvania has an interest in achieving uniformity in a 
situation where the ceding company [like PEIC here] has 
ceded portions of its risk to various reinsurers.‖  2011 WL 
2003359 at *10 (citing Ario, 996 A.2d at 596-97).  But in this 
case, having multiple jurisdictions‘ laws apply to the same 
risk is an undesirable consequence entirely of PEIC‘s own 
doing.  PEIC chose to purchase reinsurance from two New 
York companies, an Illinois company, and a Massachusetts 
company, rather than four companies from the same 
jurisdiction.   
Ultimately, while both New York and Pennsylvania 
have interests in applying their law here, PEIC has 
undermined and lessened Pennsylvania‘s interests and has 
failed to persuade us that those interests, even if unimpaired, 
substantially outweigh the parties‘ justified expectation that 
the provisions of their contract would be valid.  
In sum, we conclude that New York has the most 
significant relationship to the Certificate and the greater 
interest in having its law applied, especially because applying 
its law would protect the parties‘ justified expectations at the 
time of contracting.  Thus, New York‘s law applies and the 




V.  Whether Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain 
Finally, PEIC argues that even if New York law 
applies, there are genuine issues of material fact that 
nonetheless preclude summary judgment.  We disagree. 
First, we fail to see how, as PEIC suggests, Global 
possibly waived its right to avoid coverage based on any non-
compliance with Paragraph D.  According to PEIC, Global 
had actual and constructive knowledge of the facts it needed 
to make its DSOL argument by April 2008, but did nothing 
until October 2009, when it first asserted defenses to 
coverage and did not even mention late notice or the DSOL.  
Even if this were true, however, Paragraph L of the 
Certificate provides that ―[t]he terms of this Certificate of 
Reinsurance shall not be waived or changed except by 
endorsement issued to form a part hereof, executed by a duly 
authorized representative of the Reinsurer.‖  PEIC does not 
suggest that such a formal endorsement occurred here or that 
this provision of the Certificate is somehow unenforceable.  
In fact, it does not mention this provision of the Certificate at 
all. 
Although it faults Global for ―relying on a non-existent 
district court finding that PEIC breached the DSOL 
provision‖ and asserts that the question of ―whether [the 
DSOL] was breached‖ precludes summary judgment, see 
PEIC Br. at 45-47, PEIC does not seriously suggest that, if we 
adopt the District Court‘s interpretation of Paragraph D (as 
we do), it promptly provided Global with a DSOL.  Recall 
that Buffalo Forge gave PEIC notice of asbestos-related 
claims and lawsuits in April 2001.  According to PEIC, 
beginning in October 2005 it asked its broker to keep all its 
reinsurers informed about the developments in the Buffalo 
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Forge matter throughout PEIC‘s handling of the claim, but it 
appears that the broker did not pass the reports on to Global.  
According to Global, PEIC first told it about Buffalo Forge in 
April 2008.  Even under PEIC‘s best case scenario, it would 
not have provided a DSOL until four years after Buffalo 
Forge notified it of claims or occurrences involving deaths, 
serious injuries and lawsuits.  PEIC points us to no authority 
that suggests such a lengthy delay was ―prompt.‖ 
VI.  Conclusion 
 We reverse the District Court‘s Final Order and 
Judgment, and remand with instructions that the Court enter a 
judgment of non-liability in Global‘s favor. 
